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I.  Introduction
Founded in 1966, the Asian Development Bank was modeled closely on the World Bank,
the first multilateral development bank (MDB).  One of the fundamental principles of
multilateralism is independence from direct donor control.  While no agency is likely to be
completely free of economic and political constraints, a greater degree of independence allows
multilateral agencies to allocate their resources more efficiently (in terms of promoting social and
economic development) and lends credibility to their policy advice while also strengthening their
information signaling role (Rodrik, 1995).
Yet since the ADB’s early days, critics have charged that the two major donors, Japan and
the United States, have had extensive influence over lending, policy and staffing decisions (Krasner,
1981; Upton, 2000: 68,70; Wihtol, 1988).  Studies of other MDBs generally find either dominance
by one donor or relatively diffuse control.  The United States appears to play the dominant role in
the World Bank (Akins, 1981; Andersen et al., 2005; Fleck and Kilby, 2005; Harrigan et al., 2004)
and the Inter-American Development Bank (Strand, 2003A).  In contrast, the African Development
Bank has limited explicitly the participation of non-regional countries, effectively preventing any
member from dominating the institution, either in terms of formal voting power or operations
(Strand, 2001; Mingst, 1990).1  Given the origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development at the end of the Cold War, states that might have dominated the institution
(particularly France and the United States) were forced to compromise, accepting an institution
embedded in the existing European institutional structure with a relatively even distribution of
voting power (Strand, 2003B; Weber, 1994).  Thus, among the MDBs, the ADB is unique in having
two dominant members.
This paper examines the degree to which the geographic distribution of ADB lending (from
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both the highly concessional Asian Development Fund [ADF] and the near market rate Ordinary
Capital Resources [OCR]) mirrors Japanese and U.S. interests.  Estimation uses panel data for less
developed Asian countries from 1968 to 2002.  After controlling for factors consistent with the
institution’s apolitical mandate (i.e., related to need and development effectiveness), I introduce
measures of donor interests to test for donor influence.  Estimation results suggest significant donor
influence with inconsistent weight placed on humanitarian criteria given limited funding for the
region’s largest countries, China and India.  Comparing the results with work on the geographic
distribution of World Bank lending by Fleck and Kilby (2005) suggests a greater influence of donor
interests relative to recipient need in the allocation of resources at the ADB than at the World Bank.
Rodrik (1995) presents an interesting economic case for the existence of an MDB based on
its independence from donors.  Taking a world with bilateral aid and well-developed international
capital markets as given, what efficiency gain justifies the existence of costly MDBs?  Rodrik argues
that because a multilateral organization has more independence than bilateral aid agencies, it can
provide more credible signals to private capital markets and impose conditionality with less
perceived damage to sovereignty.  Linking multilateral lending to these activities makes them
incentive compatible so that private investors will have faith in the multilateral’s signals and
exercise of conditionality.  Two corollaries follow.  First, the argument for independence extends
to the allocation of funds since loans are the means by which signaling and conditionality take place.
Second, the greater the independence of the multilateral, the greater the efficiency gain over bilateral
agencies.
Rodrik’s argument does not explain overlapping multilateral institutions.  Given the
existence of the World Bank, why do regional development banks persist and even multiply;
certainly the signaling and conditionality functions are better implemented by one agency than by
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several.  The findings of this paper suggesting more extensive donor influence in the ADB than in
the World Bank further complicate the story.  The degree of influence over the distribution of ADB
funds that Japan and the U.S. appear to enjoy justifies the ADB’s existence on political grounds but
calls into question its relative merits on economic grounds.
II.  Aid allocation and multilateral governance
Much of the aid allocation literature has focused on donor interest versus recipient need as
determinants of the distribution of aid between recipient countries.2  In general, researchers have
found geopolitical and commercial interests particularly important for the U.S. (Alesina and Dollar,
2000), commercial interests particularly important for Japan (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Schraeder
et al., 1998; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004; Tuman et al., 2001; Tuman and Strand, 2006) and
humanitarian concerns particularly important for small donors, namely Canada, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Stokke, 1989).3  A number of studies of
Japanese bilateral aid consider whether Japanese policy reacts to U.S. pressure (gaiatsu) with
positive results for Africa (Hickman, 1993; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004), mixed findings for Latin
America (Katada, 1997; Tuman et al., 2001) but no evidence in Asia (Tuman and Strand, 2006).
Previous work on multilateral aid allocation finds more emphasis on recipient need as compared to
bilateral aid as a whole (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  However, several
studies of World Bank lending uncover patterns of apparent donor influence that reflect trade and
commercial financial flows (Akins, 1981; Fleck and Kilby, 2005; Frey and Schneider, 1986;
Weck-Hannemann and Schneider, 1991) and UN voting (Andersen et al., 2005).
Japanese and U.S. influence is the focus of much of the literature on ADB governance (Dutt,
1997, 2001; Krasner, 1981; Wan, 1995; Wihtol, 1988; Yasutomo, 1983, 1995).  Japan has significant
sway because of its generous funding (especially for the ADF) and Bank staffing (Japanese president
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and close ties with Japan’s Ministry of Finance).  U.S. influence derives from its leading economic
and military position in world affairs, the ADB charter which gives the U.S. and Japan equal voting
weights, and funding mechanisms which allow the most recalcitrant member–typically the
U.S.–significant leverage (Wihtol, 1988).  Mirroring patterns in bilateral aid, analysis of governance
suggests that the ADB promotes both Japanese commercial interests and U.S. economic and
geopolitical interests (Dutt, 1997, 2001; Wihtol, 1988).
While most researchers conclude that Japan and the United States have a very important
influence on ADB policies and operations, relatively little quantitative work has been done on how
ADB aid allocation relates to donor interests.  Krasner (1981) examines correlations between ADB
lending and measures of Japanese and U.S. interests (net resource flows, ODA, and trade).  The
correlations for Japan are uniformly high while U.S. correlations are lower and more variable.
Krasner attributes this to different objectives, i.e., the long-term geopolitical interests of a hegemon
versus the narrower commercial interests of a “normal power.”
Wihtol (1988) also compares bilateral aid and ADB loans, noting that ADB loans align
closely with Japanese bilateral aid, a pattern still apparent in the data.  The top four recipients of
ADB funding (Indonesia, Pakistan, China and Korea) received 52% of ADB loans in real terms
between 1968 and 2002; the same group received 48% of regional Japanese aid and 36% of regional
U.S. aid.  Countries at odds with the U.S. often received little or no ADB money (e.g., Afghanistan
between the Soviet invasion and the fall of the Taliban, Vietnam immediately after the American
withdrawal, Cambodia until the early 1990s, and Laos until the late 1980s).  Taiwan received no new
loans after losing its UN seat to China in 1971, but not until 1986 did the ADB grant China
membership, “partly due to strong [U.S.] congressional opposition to such a move” (Wihtol, 1988:
102).  Restricted Indian access to the ADB reflected Japan’s concern that, because of its size and
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poverty, India might consume too large a share of the institution’s resources and, in a sense,
dominate the institution.  Wihtol concludes that “the allocation of lending by country...[is] largely
a reflection of the political and economic concerns of the [Asian Development] Bank’s donors”
(Wihtol, 1988: 173).
III.  Estimation Methods and Data
The basic approach in this paper is similar to Fleck and Kilby (2005).  Since some less
developed Asian countries receive no ADB disbursements in some years, I estimate a two part model
with a selection equation and an allocation equation.  The equations include variables consistent
with the ADB’s charter, i.e., measures of recipient need and ability to use aid well (aid
effectiveness), plus donor-specific variables that reflect the donor’s commercial and geopolitical
interests in the recipient country.
The two part model includes a selection equation (estimated via probit) where the dependent
variable indicates whether or not a country received ADB funds in a given year.  A separate
allocation equation is estimated for the sample that does receive ADB funding; the dependent
variable is the share of ADB funds received.  The chief limitations of a two part model are: (1)
interpretation of the allocation equation coefficients as conditional on selection; and (2) the
assumption that the unobserved factors influencing selection and the unobserved factors influencing
allocation are uncorrelated (independence of equations).  If independence holds, it is possible to
construct unconditional estimates.  A Heckman selection model (Type 2 tobit that does not require
independence of equations) fails to reject independence of the equations for most samples and
specifications while also imposing practical limits on model specification.  This approach is more
general than a tobit model as the selection and allocation equations can differ (e.g., population or
GDP can play different roles in a country’s “graduation” from the ADB than in the allocation of
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funds to countries that have not yet graduated).  Neumayer (2003) applies a two part model to aid
allocation; for a textbook treatment, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 544-546, 680-681).
A number of difficult specification issues arise in almost every aid allocation estimation.
There is as yet no consensus on what form of dependent variable to use; indeed, different forms are
useful for answering different questions.  Depending on their focus, previous studies have used the
level of aid in year t to recipient i (Ait), aid per capita (Ait/Nit), aid as a share of GDP (Ait/Yit), or aid
to recipient i as a share of the donor’s aid to all countries (Ait/EjAjt).  The level of aid is
straightforward; policy debates are typically cast in these terms.  Aid per capita captures how much
aid “should” go to the recipient and has been used extensively in donor interest-recipient need
models (i.e., testing neo-realist versus idealist interpretations of aid).  Aid as a share of GDP is a key
measure for questions of growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), aid dependency (O’Connell and
Soludo, 2001), and the degree of donor leverage but is not closely tied to certain standard rationale
for aid allocation.4
This paper employs aid as a share of the donor’s overall regional aid to capture directly the
relative importance of one recipient versus another.  That is, do countries favored by Japan or the
U.S. have better access to ADB funding?  Aid shares emerge as a natural measure of aid flows in
some theoretical models of aid allocation (Fleck and Kilby, 2005; Trumbull and Wall, 1994).
Certain independent variables are easily expressed in shares (e.g., population shareit = Nit/EjNjt,
export shareit = EXit/EjEXjt) while others are not (e.g., GDP per capita, degree of democracy).
In a simple two part model, the ADB first decides whether a country is eligible for loan
disbursements.  The selection equation summarizes this decision with a latent “eligibility” variable
s*.  Country i receives funds in year t if s*it > 0 where s*it is given by:
s*it = Qit"0 + ZJit"1 + ZUSit"2 + <it (1)
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The ADB then decides how to allocate shares of a fixed budget between eligible countries:
sADBit = Qit$0 + ZJit$1 + ZUSit$2 + ,it for sADBit > 0 (2)
Q captures recipient need and aid effectiveness while ZJ and ZUS reflect Japanese and U.S.
commercial and geopolitical interests.  The coefficients may differ across equations so that variables
can play different roles in the selection and allocation decisions.  A key assumption of a two part
model is that unobserved factors influencing selection and allocation are uncorrelated, i.e., E(<it,it)
= 0.  The hypothesis of no donor influence is "1 = 0, "2 = 0, $1 = 0 and $2 = 0.
The set of variables included in Q could be sizable.  Just considering recipient need, the
Millennium Development Goals set out 6 social goals with 16 indicators (United Nations, 2005).
Add to this measures of aid effectiveness.  These data requirements present a serious problem
because, beyond the most basic measures (population, GDP, degree of democracy), year and country
coverage is spotty.  In an analysis of the allocation of aid between countries, one stands to lose a lot
from reduced country coverage.  In addition, the sample of countries reporting data is unlikely to
be random; countries with closer ties to Japan and the U.S. are more likely to collect and report
data.5  Even setting aside issues of sample coverage, using a large number of variables may not
capture perceived recipient need or aid effectiveness well if inaccuracies in reported data are known
to aid agencies or if the relationship between the data and the abstract concepts of interest is
complex.  On this latter point, consider a PPP measure of GDP per capita, seemingly the nature
proxy for recipient need.  Even this measure has shortcomings:  it ignores important distributional
issues, correlates with aid effectiveness, and may proxy for donor self-interest (e.g., market
potential).  Such multiple correlations have plagued interpretation of results in the literature.
The ideal Q would be a rating by a well-informed, humanitarian expert or organization that
knows the shortcomings of official data and weighs trade-offs between need and effectiveness.  This
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assessment should be that of the aid community since the goal is not to look for “mistakes” the ADB
might make in pursuing humanitarian goals but rather is to uncover elements of the aid allocation
process that are not based on humanitarian considerations.
A version of such a humanitarian rating is available.  As discussed above, a group of small
donors–Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden–arguably pursue humanitarian
goals in the allocation of their aid.  Thus, one can view small donor aid share as the humanitarian
rating.  Since individual small donors may limit the scope of their programs, the small donor
aggregate is appropriate.  One benefit of using small donor bilateral aid data is that they come from
the OECD and are not subject to the limited coverage or uncertain provenance of other LDC data.
The key advantage of using small donor aid to proxy for need is that, because small donors are
small, they do not have the power to influence ADB lending significantly.  Strand (1999) finds that
the ADB’s voting system reduces the voting power of small donors.  For example, the 1990 Johnston
voting power indices were: Japan .174, the U.S. .174, Canada .081, Denmark 0, the Netherlands 0,
Norway 0, and Sweden 0.  Because small donors are relatively powerless in the ADB, they need not
be totally or even mostly humanitarian.  Small donor aid is an effective proxy if it has a
humanitarian component and small donors do not cater to Japan, the U.S., or the ADB bureaucracy.
Donor interest variables (Z) present a similar set of problems.  For some potentially
important variables (e.g., FDI), coverage is poor and definitions are inconsistent across countries
and over time.  Again, the relationship between variables and donor interests may be complex and
variable.  A military base may be important to the donor at one point in time but simply an expense
at another juncture.  Commercial interest often hinge on future expectations rather than current
markets.  Finally, donor interest measures should be symmetric for Japan and the U.S.  As above,
the ideal would be donor ratings of a country’s commercial and political importance.
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Again, a version of such donor interest ratings is available in the form of bilateral aid shares.
The literature on aid allocation finds that Japanese bilateral aid closely reflects Japanese commercial
interests and that U.S. bilateral aid mirrors U.S. commercial and geopolitical interests.  Japanese and
U.S. bilateral aid shares are clearly not perfect measures, however.  First, these aid programs may
have some humanitarian component (hence the importance of including humanitarian control
variables).  Second, donor interests served by bilateral aid may not be the same as those served by
multilateral aid; a donor may view bilateral and multilateral aid as substitutes.  The most obvious
case is when, for political reasons, a donor cannot directly support a recipient but still wishes to
provide aid.  This may result in a downward bias understating donor influence or, in the extreme,
lead to a negative link between donor bilateral aid share and ADB aid share.
Another important issue is the possibility that aid coordination may lead to an endogeneity
problem.  Multilateral agencies frequently convene donor meetings to coordinate aid policies toward
particular recipients.  Does one interpret high Japanese or U.S. aid shares as causing high ADB aid
shares or the reverse?  In fact, with the small donor aid variable included in the estimation, this
should not be a problem if the small donors are humanitarian.  If the small donors participate in
coordinated efforts, one can interpret coordination as driven by humanitarian concerns.  If they do
not participate, one can interpret coordination as driven by other interests.
However, two more difficult issues do arise.  First, Japanese and U.S. interests may coincide
(e.g., a country with oil reserves and market potential–Indonesia–may be of interest to both) or Japan
may simply follow the U.S. lead as a form of burden sharing or gaiatsu (Hickman, 1993; Katada,
1997; Tuman et al., 2001; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004; Tuman and Strand, 2006).  Bilateral aid data
cannot distinguish between coinciding interests and gaiatsu, complicating attribution.  Fortunately,
in Asia, this problem is substantially reduced since there is little evidence of Japanese bilateral aid
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following U.S. interests in this region (Tuman and Strand, 2006).  The second issue is whether donor
aid allocations are negatively coordinated:  the small donors may choose to specialize in countries
because they receive less aid from large donors such as Japan, the U.S. and the ADB.  The limited
empirical research on this topic provides no clear overall pattern.6
The discussion above is summarized in the following modified selection and allocation
equations:
s*it = Qit"0 + sSDit"1 + ZJit"2 + sJit"3 + ZUSit"4 + sUSit"5 + <it (3)
sADBit = Qit$0 + sSDit$1 + ZJit$2 + sJit$3 + ZUSit$4 + sUSit$5 + ,it for sADBit > 0 (4)
As before, a country receives funds (sADBit > 0) only if s*it > 0.  Q now represents a limited set of
widely available measures of recipient need/aid effectiveness.  sSD is small donor aid share and
proxies for unmeasured dimensions of recipient need/aid effectiveness.  ZJ are a limited set of
Japanese interest variables; sJ is Japanese bilateral aid share and proxies for unobserved Japanese
interests.  ZUS are a limited set of U.S. interest variables; sUS is U.S. bilateral aid share and proxies
for unobserved U.S. interests.  The hypothesis that Japanese interests do not influence ADB lending
is "2=0, "3=0, $2=0 and $3=0.  The hypothesis that U.S. interests do not influence ADB lending is
"4=0, "5=0, $4=0 and $5=0.
One important issue in estimating the selection and allocation equations is the panel nature
of the data.  The probit estimation for the selection equation reports statistics based on panel
corrected standard errors.7  The estimation method for the allocation equation is a panel version of
feasible generalized least squares that allows for a common AR1 process across panels.8  All
specifications include year dummies though results are similar excluding these terms.
All data are annual.  The aid share variables (sADB, sSD, sJ and sUS) are calculated from gross
disbursements of official assistance (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2004).  I use
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disbursements in part because the OECD only reports commitments for Official Development
Assistance (ODA); loans from the ADB’s hard window (OCR) are not sufficiently concessional to
qualify as ODA.  Using gross figures avoids problems with negative shares and better captures what
donors can control.9  sADB includes disbursements from both OCR and the more concessional ADF.
sSD is the combined share of Canadian, Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, and Swedish bilateral aid gross
disbursements.10
The Q variables come from several data sources.  Population and GDP figures are
constructed from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002) and the World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 2004); the index of democracy is from the Polity IV Project (2000).  These
variables are lagged by one year to better reflect the information set when the ADB makes allocation
decisions.  GDP is per capita in PPP terms using 1996 dollars.  The democracy index places
countries on a scale of -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy).
ZJ and ZUS include commercial and geopolitical variables.  Four trade variables (Japanese
exports to the country, Japanese imports from the country, U.S. exports to the country, and U.S.
imports from the country) are extracted from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade
Statistics (2004), lagged by two years to reduce the potential for reverse causation, and converted
to shares.  Specifications also include world exports to and imports from the country (where “the
world” covers all countries–including Japan and the U.S.) so that the separate Japanese and U.S.
variables capture the differential effect of trade with Japan and the U.S.  The geopolitical variables
measure alignment with Japanese and U.S. votes in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and are
lagged by one year.  Using data from Voeten (2004), I constructed a simple measure (UN alignment)
following Thacker (1999) and Dreher and Jensen (2007) which ranges from 0 (always voting the
opposite) to 1 (always voting the same).11
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.  The selection equation sample is an unbalance panel
of 574 observations on 27 countries.12  The time period for the unlagged variables is 1968 to 2002
though the data do not cover the full period for all countries.  The shortest time series is one year,
the average is 21, and half the countries are covered for 30 years or more.  Eighty-one percent of the
observations have positive ADB lending with 17 countries receiving no ADB funds for at least one
year.  Japanese aid share (sJ) reaches its maximum at almost 34% (Indonesia, 1992); China, Fiji, and
Taiwan received no Japanese aid for at least one year.  U.S. aid share (sUS) peaks at about 40%
(India, 1968); 12 countries got no U.S. aid for at least one year.  Small donor aid share (sSD) reaches
over 50% (India, 1971) with China, Mongolia, and Taiwan receiving no small donor aid for at least
one year.
[Table 1 about here]
Population share runs from 0.02% (Bahrain, 1996) to 48% (China, 1967).  PPP GDP per
capita averages $3,676, ranging from $397 (Myanmar, 1968) to $24,939 (Singapore, 1996).  The
share of world exports going to the country runs from 0% (Bangladesh, 1971; Bhutan, 1995) to 33%
(China, 1998); imports from 0% (Bangladesh, 1971; Bhutan, 1995) to 41% (China, 2000).  The share
of Japan’s exports going to the country runs from 0% (Bangladesh, 1971; Bhutan, 1995; Kyrgyz
Republic, 1993) to 31% (China, 1985); imports from 0% for Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Fiji,
and the Kyrgyz Republic (various years) to 44% (China, 1998).  The share of U.S. exports going to
the country ranges from zero in various years for Bangladesh, China, Fiji, Laos, and Mongolia to
43% for India in 1966; imports from none (Bangladesh, China, and Fiji) to 45% (China, 2000).
The democracy index averages 0.277, ranging from a low of -9 (31 observations on seven
countries) to the highest possible value of 10 (Malaysia, 1967-68 and Papua New Guinea).
The UN alignment variable can be constructed for 516 of the observations in the full sample.
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UN alignment with Japan averages 0.736, ranging from 0.472 (Pakistan, 1967) to 1 (Cambodia,
1997).  UN alignment with the U.S. is much lower (perhaps because of regional interests or
idiosyncratic U.S. positions); it averages 0.401, ranging from 0.216 (Indonesia, 1991) to 0.923
(Taiwan, 1971).
The lower portion of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the allocation equation sample
(sADB>0) which includes 466 observations on 22 countries.13  The exclusion of China (before 1986)
and India (before 1987) from ADB borrowing drives many of the differences between the two
samples.  ADB loans share (sADB) reaches a maximum of over 50% (Korea, 1969).  Japanese aid and
U.S. aid are slightly higher in the restricted sample while small donor aid is slightly lower.  The
exclusion of China and India from the early part of the sample largely accounts for lower average
population while Singapore’s effective graduation (and Korea’s temporary graduation) from the
ADB accounts for lower average GDP.  Korea (during the 1998 Asian financial crisis) sets the
maximum GDP per capita for a country receiving ADB funds.  Again, the absence of China and
India from the earlier part of the sample lowers trade averages.  Korea (1996) is now the top
destination of U.S. exports.  Perhaps the most notable change is the rise in mean democracy score
in the restricted sample.14  The sample is reduced to 435 observations for UN alignment.
IV.  Estimation Results
This section presents estimation results for the selection and allocation equations.  I estimate
the selection equation for the full sample and for the slightly smaller sample with UN voting data.
I repeat this for the allocation equation for the sample with positive ADB shares and also compare
results for 1968 to 1986 with those for 1987-2002.  The more limited variation in dichotomous ADB
eligibility variable limits the usefulness of analyzing sub-periods for the selection equation.
Table 2 reports results for the probit estimation of the selection equation.  Column (2.1) gives
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results for the full sample (574 observations from 1968 to 2002 on 27 countries) excluding UN
variables, column (2.2) gives results for the UN sample (516 observations from 1968 to 1997 on 27
countries) excluding UN variables, and column (2.3) includes UN variables.  All specifications
include year dummies; z-statistics are based on panel corrected standard errors with clustering on
countries.
[Table 2 about here]
The negative and significant population coefficient indicates that the probability of receiving
ADB funds is significantly lower for more populous countries, a pattern apparently at odds with a
humanitarian rationale for aid.  Evaluated at the mean values for all other variables, the predicted
probability of receiving ADB funds in equation (2.1) falls by 35 percentage points when population
share increases from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean (from 6.1% to 18.3%).15
This reflects the exclusion of China and India from ADB borrowing prior to 1986/87; the estimated
population coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant in a sample that drops China and
India prior to 1987.
In contrast, the negative and significant estimated coefficient for GDP per capita is consistent
with a humanitarian rationale for lending.  Ceteris paribus, increasing GDP per capita to one
standard deviation above the sample mean (from $3,680 to $7,410) reduces the predicted probability
of receiving ADB funds by 16 percentage points.  Because this predicted probability differential is
smaller than that for population, one can only say that ADB eligibility reflects humanitarian factors
when setting aside China and India before 1987.  However, doing so reduces the magnitude and
significance of the coefficient on GDP per capita.  The predicted probability differential from the
above difference in GDP per capita falls to five percentage points.
The democracy index consistently enters with a positive and significant coefficient.  With
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other variables set at the sample mean, the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds increases
by 18 percentage points when moving from the lowest democracy rating in the sample (-9) to the
highest (10).  Thus, a country’s chances of receiving ADB funds increase with its level of
democratization.16
Small donor aid share (sSD) enters with a negative though fairly small and statistically
insignificant coefficient across the selection equation estimates (though approaching significance
in the UN alignment sample).  Thus, ceteris paribus, countries that receive more small donor aid (for
humanitarian or other reasons) are not more likely to get ADB funding.
Turning to trade variables, World exports enter with a positive and significant estimated
coefficient.  The predicted probability of receiving ADB funds increases by 48 percentage points
when moving from zero to the mean level of World export share (6.1%).17  The differential impact
of Japan importing goods from the country is also positive and statistically significant though
smaller; the equivalent probability differential is 14 percentage points.  This positive result is
consistent with the political economy of Japanese trade policy.  A significant amount of Japanese
imports from less developed Asian countries are essential raw materials or intermediate goods in the
supply chain orchestrated by Japanese firms.  Japanese exports also enter with a positive coefficient
though it is substantially smaller and statistically insignificant.18
In contrast, the sizeable negative and significant estimated coefficient for U.S. exports does
not fit well with the political economy of U.S. trade policy; countries that buy a larger share of U.S.
exports are less likely to receive ADB funds, ceteris paribus.  This link is robust in a number of
respects.  It persists across the three specifications in Table 2 and across different time periods.  It
is not driven by a few countries (such as Korea and Singapore–which trade a lot with U.S. but have
effectively graduated from the ADB–or China and India).  Finally, it does not appear to be driven
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by outliers as a quadratic term proves insignificant.  Ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation
increase in U.S. exports (from the mean of 6.1% to 13.7%) decreases the predicted probability of
receiving ADB funds by 40 percentage points.  One could imagine that the U.S. looks at export
growth potential (as proxied by a small share of current U.S. exports).  However, the same story
does not carry-over to the level of ADB funding.19
The share of U.S. imports coming from the country also enters negatively–in this case
consistent with the political economy of U.S. trade policy which vilifies countries selling to the U.S.
as dumping goods and stealing jobs–but the coefficient is small and statistically insignificant
throughout.
Both Japanese and U.S. bilateral aid shares (sJt and sUSt) enter positively and significantly.
Going from no Japanese aid to the average share increases the predicted probability of receiving
ADB funds by seven percentage points while the same comparison for U.S. aid predicts a six
percentage point increase.  Recalling the earlier result, the probability of receiving ADB funds
increases with Japanese or American bilateral aid but does not increase with aid from the small
donors.
Column 2.2 reports results for the UN sample without UN variables.  The sample shrinks
from 574 to 516 observations as Bangladesh, China, Republic of Korea and Taiwan have no UN data
for certain years.  Comparing column (2.2) with those on the left and right, it is evident that the
(few) changes are due to the reduced sample (2.1 to 2.2) rather than the inclusion of the UN
variables (2.2 to 2.3).
  The first notable difference is the estimated trade coefficients.  All decrease in absolute
value except the Japanese and U.S. export coefficients.  The change is particularly striking for the
import variables, with the World import coefficient shrinking by a factor of 17 (though insignificant
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in both specifications) and U.S. and Japanese import coefficients falling by two thirds or more.  With
the drop in magnitude, the Japanese import coefficient is no longer statistically significant.
Conversely, the estimated coefficient on Japanese exports doubles in magnitude and approaches
statistical significance.20  It comes as no surprise that trade coefficients change substantially since
the data points omitted are for very large traders (China, Korea, Taiwan) and very small traders
(Bangladesh).
The second change is a slight reversal between the Japanese and U.S. aid share coefficients
with the latter gaining in size and statistical significance and the former falling in size and statistical
significance.  Repeating the previous simulations, going from no Japanese aid to a 6.1% share
increases the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds by three percentage points while the
same change for U.S. aid share results in a six percentage point increase.
Turning to UN voting alignment, the Japanese UN voting coefficient is positive but
statistically insignificant.  The U.S. UN voting coefficient is about the same magnitude but negative
and again statistically insignificant.  The sign of the Japanese coefficient is consistent with Japan’s
much publicized bid for a seat on the security council (Drifte, 2000); Japanese influence over access
to ADB funds could be used to reward countries that vote with Japan in the UN.  A more strategic
approach (akin to a swing voter model) might target countries that are neither clear allies nor clear
enemies; however, the data show no evidence of such a strategy.21  Thus, as measured by UN
alignment with Japan or the U.S., there is no evidence that UN voting has a significant influence on
ADB eligibility in the full sample.
What is the overall importance of recipient need versus donor interest in determining access
to ADB funding?  While GDP per capita and democracy go in the “right” direction, population and
small donor aid (though not significant) do not.  In a one to one comparison, the effect of GDP per
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capita is larger than that of either Japanese or U.S. bilateral aid but smaller than the trade effects
(Japanese imports or U.S. exports).  Democracy is on par with bilateral aid effects but also smaller
than trade effects.  Simulations based on (2.1) confirm the dominance of donor interests.  Increasing
“recipient need” by one standard deviation (population up from 6.1% to 18.3%, GDP per capita
down from $3,676 to 0, and democracy up from 0.28 to 6.90) should raise the predicted probability
of receiving ADB funds.  Decreasing the unambiguous donor interest variables by one standard
deviation (Japanese imports from 6.1% to 0, Japanese aid share from 6.1% to 0, and U.S. aid share
from 6.1% to 0) should decrease the predicted probability.  The combined effect of these changes
is a 56 percentage point decrease in the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds.  Repeating
the exercise but excluding the effects of China and India pre-1987, the predicted probability falls
by over 70 percentage points.22  Thus, by this measure, the donor interest variables appear to
dominate eligibility for ADB funds.
[Table 3 about here]
The allocation equation in Table 3 is conditional on selection, i.e., the sample only includes
observations with positive values of sADB.  As stated above, Table 3 is estimated via feasible GLS
that allows for heteroskedasticity across panels and a common AR1 error term.  The table’s structure
mirrors Table 2.  Column (3.1) reports results for the full sample (466 observations from 1968 to
2002 on 22 countries), column (3.2) reports results for the UN sample (435 observations from 1968
to 2002 on 22 countries) excluding UN variables, and column (3.3) includes UN variables.  As
before, (3.2) demonstrates that differences arising from including UN variables are due to the
reduced sample size rather than the introduction of the variables per se.
Table 3 includes a quadratic term for population.23  The estimates indicate that the share of
ADB funds a country receives increases with its population up to a population share of 19%, i.e.,
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for all countries except China and India.  The decreasing marginal return from the negative quadratic
term implies that, ceteris paribus, India would receive 6.4% of ADB funds based on its population
share of 32%, comparable to what Pakistan or Indonesia would receive based on their population
shares.  China, with a population share of 42%, receives a 13 percentage point smaller ADB loan
share than would an otherwise identical country with average population.  Excluding China and
India from the estimation sample, the quadratic term is insignificant and, dropping it, the estimated
population coefficient is 1.6:  a one percentage point higher population share is associated with a
1.6 percentage point higher ADB loan share, ceteris paribus.  Thus, there are both parallels and
contrasts with the selection equation.  In both cases, there is “discrimination” against China and
India due to their size (and potential to absorb the bulk of the ADB’s funds).  However, setting aside
China and India, population is an important determinant for allocation but not for selection.
GDP per capita enters negatively in all allocation specifications.  The estimated equation
predicts that a $1000 higher PPP GDP per capita is associated with a 0.23 percentage point lower
in ADB loan share.  Measured in terms of standard deviations from the mean, this is about one tenth
the size of the population effect.  The estimated coefficients for Democracy and Small Donor aid
share are insignificant and small in all specifications.24  One control variable, World import share,
does approach significance (p=0.07), entering with a positive coefficient.
 The insignificant coefficient for Small Donor aid share contrasts sharply with work on the
World Bank (Fleck and Kilby, 2005) where small donor aid exhibits a strong, positive link with
World Bank lending.  One possible explanation is that Small Donor aid within Asia is less tightly
linked with humanitarian considerations than it is on a global scale.  However, the correlation
between small donor aid and the other humanitarian measures suggests otherwise.  Compared to
ADB lending, Japanese aid, and U.S. aid, small donor aid has the largest positive correlation with
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population, the largest negative correlation with GDP per capita, and the largest positive correlation
with Democracy, all consistent with a strongly humanitarian allocation.  In addition, with World
Bank lending as the dependent variable in (3.1), Small Donor aid share is significant and positive.
This evidence favors a second interpretation, that the role of humanitarian factors is more
circumscribed in the allocation of ADB funds, e.g., limited to considerations of population and GDP
per capita.
The only other variable with a statistically significant coefficient in the full sample is
Japanese aid share (sJ).  A one percentage point increase in Japanese aid share is associated with a
0.2 percentage point increase in ADB loan share.  Gauging this in terms of standard deviations, a
one standard deviation increase in Japanese aid share (7.4 percentage points) predicts a 1.5
percentage point increase in ADB loan share from an average of 7.5 percent to 9 percent.  This is
more than double the effect of a one standard deviation decrease in GDP per capita and about a
quarter of the effect of a one standard deviation increase in population share (starting from the
sample mean).  The estimated coefficients for the other donor interest variables (Japanese and U.S.
trade shares and U.S. aid share) are small and far from statistical significance.
Column (3.3) illustrates that UN alignment is not a significant determinant of ADB
disbursements in the sample of countries receiving ADB funds across the 1968 to 2002 time period.
As in the selection equation, Japanese UN alignment enters with a positive but insignificant
coefficient and U.S. UN alignment enters with a negative but insignificant coefficient (and in this
case, very small).  Other coefficient estimates are largely unaffected by the reduced sample (435
observations, down from 466) or the introduction of the new variables.  Japanese aid share,
population share, and GDP per capita are again significant with the same signs and magnitude.  The
estimated coefficient for World import share increases slightly and now boarders on significance.
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The question of whether the humanitarian or donor interest variables play a larger role in
allocation among eligible countries depends heavily on the metric used.  With the quadratic
population specification, funding increases with size (in line with the humanitarian rationale) except
in the cases of China and India.  If one uses the estimates from (3.1) and starts from the sample mean
to compare the impact of a one standard deviation increase in the recipient need variables
(population increasing, GDP per capita decreasing) with the impact of a one standard deviation
increase in the donor interest variables (Japanese aid share increasing), the former clearly dominate
with ADB loan share predicted to increase by 5.7 percentage points.  However, this clearly does not
reflect the experience of the 75 percent of the Asian population living in China and India since the
quadratic population term makes simulation results highly dependent on the starting point.  One
alternative is again to exclude China and India; re-estimating (3.1) and using standard deviations
from the restricted sample yields a more modest 2 percentage point increase in the predicted ADB
loan share.  Another alternative is to estimate (3.1) with only a linear population term so that the
simulation does not depend on the starting point.  This variation yields a small reversal with a 0.8
percentage point decrease in predicted ADB loan share.  Overall, humanitarian factors dominate the
allocation of ADB funds between eligible countries only when not considering the
disproportionately small allocations to China and India.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 compares ADB loan allocation before and after China and India gained access, again
conditional on access to ADB funding.  Columns (4.1) and (4.2) repeat (3.1) for the 1968 to 1986
and 1987-2002 periods while columns (4.3) and (4.4) repeat (3.3).25  This breakpoint also
conveniently divides the sample relatively evenly.  Coefficient estimates for the variables common
between the non-UN and UN specifications are comparable so I omit reporting results for the UN
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sample without the UN variables.
In column (4.1), the pre-1987 population coefficients (positive linear, negative quadratic)
indicate an allocation bias against larger countries even without China and India.  The estimated
marginal effect of population is negative for population shares over 3% (notably Bangladesh and
Indonesia).  The post-1986 population coefficients (column (4.2)) more closely mirror those for the
overall period with the estimated marginal effect of population negative for shares above 21%, again
affecting only China and India.  And, as in the overall period, excluding China and India from the
estimation sample, the quadratic term is insignificant and, dropping it, the estimated population
coefficient is 1.5.
GDP per capita enters with a negative coefficient (consistent with need-based allocation) in
both periods but is not statistically significant in either period individually.  This appears to be
simply the result of the smaller sample sizes as the variation in GDP per capita (in PPP terms and
only for countries receiving ADB funding) is essentially the same in the sub-periods as in the overall
sample.
The estimated coefficient for Democracy is positive and marginally significant in the earlier
period (p=0.06); it becomes negative, very small, and far from significant in the second period.  This
provides evidence that the link between ADB funding and democracy has changed over time but the
nature of this change is unclear.  The spread of democracy is considerable; in the unconditional
sample, the mean of the index is -1.2 in the first period and 1.8 in the second.  The sample selection
rule may also have changed.  The average democracy score is higher in the ADB eligible sample
than in the overall sample for the second period (2.5 versus 1.8) but not for the first.  Re-estimating
the selection equation with separate first and second period democracy variables reveals that the
democracy selection effect is basically in the second period.  Finally, unconditional estimates –
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either an FGLS with AR1 (not correcting for zeros) or a Tobit (not correcting for heteroskedasticity
or autocorrelation) on the unconditional sample – find a larger positive coefficient in the first period
with a p-value of 0.06.  Putting these pieces together, the most straightforward interpretation is that
the ADB’s consideration of democracy has shifted from allocation to selection but the overall effect
may have been to reduce the importance of democracy as a determinant of funding.
Turning to donor interest variables, an interesting pattern of increasing influence emerges.
While neither Japanese nor U.S. aid shares are significant in the early period, both enter with
positive and significant coefficients in the later period.  It is clear that in the overall sample receiving
aid (Table 3), the link between Japanese aid share and ADB loan share is driven more by the
association in the 1987 to 2002 period which includes lending to China and India.  Yet the result is
not driven solely by these two countries; even without China and India, Japanese aid share is
marginally significant in the 1987-2002 sample (p=0.06) and significant in the 1968-2002 sample
(p=0.009).  Turning to the U.S., the estimated U.S. aid share coefficient falls in size from the first
to second period but becomes statistically significant, a shift unrelated to the inclusion or exclusion
of China and India.  The estimated U.S. coefficient is about a quarter the magnitude of that for
Japanese aid, demonstrating again the tighter link between ADB lending and Japanese aid.  Finally,
the estimated coefficient on U.S. imports is positive and significant for the second period as
compared to negative and insignificant in the first.  This change is driven by the addition of China;
excluding China, the coefficient is essentially unchanged from the previous period (small, negative
and insignificant).
Columns (4.2) and (4.3) include the UN variables in the 1968-1986 and 1987-2002 periods.
Interestingly, the relationship between Japanese UN alignment and ADB lending reverses across the
periods, with a negative, significant coefficient first and then a positive, significant coefficient.  The
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latter coefficient become insignificant if either China or India is excluded.
V. Conclusion
This paper examines the influence of Japan and the United States over the geographic
distribution of Asian Development Bank lending.  Using panel data from 1968 to 2002 for less
developed Asian countries, a two part model points to significant donor influence.  The exclusion
of China and India (75% of the region’s population) from ADB lending prior to the mid-1980s and
their restricted level of borrowing thereafter overshadows other, positive humanitarian dimensions
of ADB lending.  Even setting aside the cases of China and India, donor trade interests and proxies
for geopolitical interests appear to play a larger role than do humanitarian factors.
The two part model includes a selection equation and an allocation equation.  The selection
equation examines the probability that a country will receive funds (eligibility).  The allocation
equation examines the level of funding among countries that did receive ADB funds.  In line with
humanitarian principles, the selection equation indicates that poorer and (especially more recently)
democratic countries are more likely to receive ADB funds.  However, more populous countries are
less likely to receive ADB funds and, ceteris paribus, eligibility for ADB funding does not mirror
the distribution of bilateral aid from a group of small donors known for their relatively humanitarian
aid programs.  Japanese trading partners and countries favored by Japanese bilateral aid are more
likely to receive ADB funds, suggesting Japanese influence.  The link between U.S. variables and
selection is more complex:  countries favored by U.S. bilateral aid are more likely to receive ADB
funds but countries with strong U.S. trade ties are less likely to receive ADB funds.  Overall, the
estimated effects of Japanese and U.S. interest variables are larger than the estimated effects of
humanitarian variables in the selection of countries to receive ADB funds.
Conditional on being selected to receive ADB funds, a country’s level of funding increases
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with its population–up to a point.  Holding other characteristics constant, funding increases with
population except for the largest countries (notably Bangladesh and Indonesia before 1987 and
China and India since then) which generally receive dramatically less in comparison to their
populations.  Of the countries receiving funds, poorer countries receive more ceteris paribus.  In the
allocation equation, democracy appears to have played a role earlier in the sample period.  However,
as with the selection equation, after controlling for other factors, the level of ADB funding does not
mirror the distribution of bilateral aid from a group of small donors known for their relatively
humanitarian aid programs.  In contrast, World Bank loan allocation does, both within Asia and
globally.  Donor interest variables, particularly those intended to reflect geopolitics, are significant
in the allocation equation primarily in the latter half of the sample period.  During that period, higher
Japanese bilateral aid and higher U.S. bilateral aid are both associated with more ADB funding, with
the link three times larger for Japanese bilateral aid.  Voting alignment with Japan in the UN is
associated with less ADB funding in the first half of the estimation period and with more ADB
funding in the second half, the latter result driven by China and India.
Overall, the evidence suggests that both Japan and the U.S. have systematic influence over
the distribution of ADB funds.  Whether examining selection or allocation, discrimination against
China (attributed to U.S. Cold War politics) and India (driven by Japanese concerns) overshadows
other potentially humanitarian aspects of ADB lending.  In a similar study of the World Bank, Fleck
and Kilby (2005) find that the single largest factor is population with more funds going to larger
countries.  The influence of U.S. interests is roughly on par with that of humanitarian factors other
than population.  The ADB case differs in that humanitarian considerations play a less apparent role.
In this sense, donor interests more heavily influence the allocation of resources in the ADB than in
the World Bank.
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1.  The distinction between voting weight (the proportion of overall votes held by a member) and
formal voting power (an a priori measure of a member’s ability to influence outcomes given the
voting weights of each member and the voting rules) is important.  For a discussion of these issues
and applications to international financial institutions see Strand (1999, 2001, 2003A, 2003B).
2.  See Neumayer (2003) for a survey.  In the international relations literature, this dichotomy is cast
as neo-realist versus idealist explanations for aid flows.  Following the literature on aid allocation,
I use the term “humanitarian” to describe aid flows that correlate with recipient need and/or
development effectiveness; I do not consider whether the donor is truly altruistic or not (e.g., seeking
a “warm glow” or the appearance of altruism).
3.  The distinction between geopolitical and commercial interests may be spurious for Japan since
it is a economic rather than military superpower.
4.  For example, discussions about how to allocation aid based on recipient need are unlikely to
focus on the aid to GDP ratio.  Consider a donor that gives the same absolute amount of aid to every
country regardless of GDP.  For two countries with the same population size but one poor and one
rich, equal aid results in a high aid to GDP ratio in the poor country and a low aid to GDP ratio in
the rich country.  More generally, negative coefficient estimates in a regression of GDP per capita
on the aid to GDP ratio do not necessarily reflect need-based aid allocation.  With a log-log
specification (when appropriate), the solution is straightforward:  log( ) = $ log( ) is
equivalent to log( ) = (1+$) log( ), implying need-based allocation only if $<!1.
However, in a linear specification, results are difficult to interpret.  In contrast, the aid to GDP ratio
may be very appropriate when the issue is a donor rewarding recipient behavior (e.g., UN voting).
5.  For example in a probit analysis, countries that trade more with the U.S. and receive more U.S.
Endnotes
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bilateral aid are significantly more likely to report infant mortality figures.
6.  Rowlands and Ketcheson (2002) examine net ODA disbursement shares to countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Up through 1990 Dutch aid is positively related to other bilateral aid (including
U.S. aid) and negatively related to IMF programs while after 1990 Dutch aid is less closely linked
to other bilateral aid and positively linked to the presence of World Bank lending.  Swedish aid is
positively linked to other bilateral aid but negatively related to U.S. bilateral aid and the presence
of World Bank lending in the earlier period but reverses in the later period so that the link with other
bilateral aid is negative and with U.S. bilateral aid positive.  Canadian aid up through 1990 is
positively related to other bilateral aid but negatively related to U.S. aid and unrelated to World
Bank or IMF activity but also reverses after 1990 so that the link with other bilateral aid programs
is negative and with U.S. bilateral aid and World Bank lending positive.
7.  Estimation of a random effects probit had computational problems; results depended on the
number of integration points even up to the system’s limit (195 for STATA 9).  In any case, Guilkey
and Murphy (1993) report that a probit with panel corrected standard errors generally performs well
when compared with a random effects probit.  Incorporating fixed effects via a conditional logit
would exclude countries that always or never get ADB funds–over one third of the observations.
8.  There are two reasons to expect autocorrelation in the allocation equation.  First, disbursements
are likely to be correlated over time because loans disburse gradually.  Second, institutional
budgeting generates inertia for bureaucratic reasons and due to defensive lending.  These sources
of autocorrelation are primarily institutional so a single autocorrelation parameter is appropriate.
For all three specifications in Table 3, a likelihood ratio test strong rejects the null hypothesis of no
AR1 (p–0 for all three specifications).
The most obvious alternative to an AR1 specification is to include country fixed effects.
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However, estimating Table 3 specifications including both fixed effects and AR1 fails to reject the
null hypothesis of no fixed effects (p=0.30 for specification (3.1), p=0.23 for specification (3.2), and
p=0.12 for specification (3.3)).  In contrast, a likelihood ratio test strong rejects the null hypothesis
of no AR1 (p–0 for all three specifications).
9.  Even gross disbursement data have a few negative entries in exceptional circumstances (e.g.,
seizure of assets by other countries).  In these few cases, gross disbursement is set to 0.
10.  The denominators of all share variables are sums over the observations in the largest sample
used (full sample selection equation in Table 2) so that shares are effectively normalized to sum to
one in that sample.
11.  For each dyad (Japan-recipient country i or US-recipient country i), I code vote agreement
(yes-yes, no-no or abstain/absent-abstain/absent) as a 1, opposite votes (yes-no or no-yes) as a 0, and
only one country abstaining/absent (yes/no-abstain/absent or abstain/absent-yes/no) as a 0.5.  UN
alignment is the mean across all recorded UNGA roll call votes in the given year.  Under this
method, a country is perfectly aligned with itself.  I include all votes rather than a subset so that
Japanese and U.S. variables will be more comparable.  UN votes are not available for certain
country-years:  Bangladesh 1972-1973; China 1967-1970, 1972-1973; Republic of Korea 1967-
1990; and Taiwan 1974-2001.  An alternative measure (Gartzke and Tucker’s [1999] UN voting
similarity, an application of Signorino and Ritter’s [1999] S measure of similarity) is highly
correlated with the variable constructed but available only through 1996.  In that sample, the two
measures give similar results.
12.  Due to data availability, the full sample covers:  Azerbaijan 1995-2002; Bahrain 1997;
Bangladesh 1973-2002, Bhutan 1997; Cambodia 1994-2000; China 1968-2002; Fiji 1971-2000;
India 1968-2002; Indonesia 1968-2002; Kazakhstan 1995-2002; Republic of Korea 1968-2002;
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Kyrgyz Republic 1995-2002; Laos 1987-1992, 1997; Malaysia 1968-2002; Mongolia 1987-1991,
1997; Myanmar 1969-1990; Nepal 1968-2002; Pakistan 1968-2002; Papua New Guinea 1976-2000;
Philippines 1968-2002; Singapore 1968-1997; Sri Lanka 1968-2002; Taiwan 1969-1999; Tajikistan
1997-2002; Thailand 1968-2002; Turkmenistan 1997; and Uzbekistan 1995-1997.
13.  The eligibility sample contains one observation on Bhutan (1997).  Although this has positive
ADB lending, it drops from the allocation sample because of the AR1 specification.
14.  The change in the average democracy score is not driven by the start of lending to China in 1986
since India enters in 1987 and the two largely cancel each other.
15.  Subsequent predicted probability differentials also hold variables at sample means except as
noted.
16.  I also explored the Freedom House and Political Terror Scale indices as alternatives to Polity
IV.  Estimation results with a composite of the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties
indices (available starting in 1972) yields the same results as with the Polity measure.  However, in
the more limited period in which the Political Terror Scale is available, none of the measures (Polity,
Freedom House, or Political Terror Scale) were significant in the selection equation probit (since
the limited variation in the dependent variable necessitates a large sample).  None of the measures
proved significant in the allocation equation.  Although Munck and Verkuilen’s (2002) review of
democracy measures notes some shortcomings in conceptualization, measurement and aggregation
in Polity IV, their assessment of the Freedom House index is generally less favorable.  Given this
and differences in coverage, I elected to use the Polity measure.  Also note that quadratic terms
prove insignificant.
17.  This comparison implies incompatible values for the trade variables (i.e., Japanese and U.S.
trade cannot be positive when world trade is zero) but does illustrate the magnitude of the effect.
18.  An F-test rejects the hypothesis that the Japanese trade variables are jointly insignificant.
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However, a specification that sums exports and imports as “trade” gives the opposite result:
Japanese trade share is positive but insignificant.  Overall, the Japanese import effect is not very
robust, falling in size and significance if a few extreme observations are dropped (e.g., early data
points for Bangladesh).
19.  Simple descriptive statistics reveal the same pattern as in the probit.  The sample correlation
between ADB eligible and U.S. export share is -0.27; the average U.S. export share is 5.1% for ADB
eligible countries and 10.5% for others.  A specification that sums exports and imports as “trade”
yields comparable results:  U.S. trade share is negative and significant.  Only when using the actual
share of ADB funds rather than the dichotomous variable is a positive correlation evident (0.14 in
the overall sample, 0.35 in the ADB eligible sample).
20.  An F-test falls to reject the hypothesis that the Japanese trade variables in (2.2) are jointly
insignificant . A specification that sums exports and imports as “trade” yields comparable results:
Japanese trade share is positive but insignificant.
21.  In a quadratic specification, the estimated coefficient on the linear terms are negative and and
on squared terms positive (none significant).  These are the opposite signs than would be expected
in a strategic model; “swing voters” have a lower predicted probability of receiving ADB funding
than either strong supporters or strong opponents.
22.  Specifically, I re-estimate (2.1) without China and India.  In this setting, Japanese trade plays
a large role with the estimated coefficients for exports and imports both large and significant.  The
simulation then varies the statistically significant variables with plausible interpretations (GDP per
capita and Democracy for need; Japanese exports and imports and U.S. aid share for donor interests)
by one standard deviation in the appropriate direction from their means (means and standard
deviations are from the estimation sample excluding China and India).  For (2.3), simulation results
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are virtually the same with or without China and India, a 60 percentage point decrease.
23.  A quadratic population term is insignificant in the selection equation.
24.  Small donor aid share does enter as positive and significant in specifications that do not
adequately control for population, e.g., excluding population share altogether or including only a
linear term in a sample that includes China and India.
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Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N Units
ADB eligiblet 0.814 0.390 0 1 574 Binary
sJt 0.061 0.073 0 0.335 574 Share
sUSt 0.061 0.082 0 0.408 574 Share
sSDt 0.061 0.091 0 0.536 574 Share
Populationt-1 0.061 0.122 0.0002 0.483 574 Share
GDP per capitat-1 3.676 3.731 0.397 24.94 574 $000 PPP 1996
World exportst-2 0.061 0.061 0 0.334 574 Share
World importst-2 0.061 0.068 0 0.413 574 Share
Japanese exportst-2 0.061 0.070 0 0.315 574 Share
Japanese importst-2 0.061 0.081 0 0.438 574 Share
U.S. exportst-2 0.061 0.076 0 0.431 574 Share
U.S. importst-2 0.061 0.083 0 0.453 574 Share
Democracyt-1 0.277 6.618 -9 10 574 -10 to 10
Japanese UN alignmentt-1 0.736 0.075 0.472 1 516 0 to 1
U.S. UN alignmentt-1 0.401 0.131 0.216 0.923 516 0 to 1
Allocation equation sample
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N Units
sADBt 0.075 0.080 0.00008 0.519 466 Share
sJt 0.067 0.074 0 0.335 466 Share
sUSt 0.064 0.079 0 0.390 466 Share
sSDt 0.059 0.074 0 0.341 466 Share
Populationt-1 0.044 0.094 0.0003 0.433 466 Share
GDP per capitat-1 3.265 2.608 0.405 14.786 466 $000 PPP 1996
World exportst-2 0.053 0.058 0 0.334 466 Share
World importst-2 0.053 0.066 0 0.413 466 Share
Japanese exportst-2 0.054 0.066 0 0.315 466 Share
Japanese importst-2 0.059 0.086 0 0.438 466 Share
U.S. exportst-2 0.051 0.065 0 0.296 466 Share
U.S. importst-2 0.055 0.077 0 0.453 466 Share
Democracyt-1 0.717 6.503 -9 10 466 -10 to 10
Japanese UN alignmentt-1 0.739 0.072 0.472 1 435 0 to 1
U.S. UN alignmentt-1 0.395 0.132 0.216 0.923 435 0 to 1
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Table 2–Selection Equation
Probit with PCSE, Dependent Variable: Receives ADB disbursements
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3)
Full sample UN sample UN sample
Populationt-1 -14.529 -15.520 -15.499
(4.42)** (4.36)** (4.36)**
GDP per capitat-1 -0.318 -0.347 -0.355
(3.33)** (2.78)** (2.81)**
Democracyt-1 0.131 0.150 0.150
(3.62)** (3.52)** (3.58)**
sSDt -5.820 -8.387 -8.429
(1.33) (1.70) (1.78)
World Exportst-2 38.449 29.714 30.079
(3.64)** (2.65)** (2.65)**
World Importst-2 -17.228 -0.569 -0.948
(1.07) (0.03) (0.05)
Japanese Exportst-2 6.905 13.556 13.651
(0.97) (1.80) (1.74)
Japanese Importst-2 18.203 6.289 6.112
(2.20)* (0.69) (0.62)
sJt 12.315 10.379 9.935
(3.00)** (2.22)* (2.13)*
Japanese UN alignmentt-1 2.037
(0.70)
US Exportst-2 -24.764 -27.327 -27.679
(4.55)** (5.13)** (5.03)**
US Importst-2 -3.811 -1.352 -0.608
(0.73) (0.28) (0.13)
sUSt 10.637 16.076 15.967
(2.52)* (3.21)** (3.13)**
U.S. UN alignmentt-1 -1.997
(0.75)
Observations 574 516 516
Number of Countries 27 27 27
Pseudo-R2 0.572 0.559 0.563
Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All specification include year dummies.
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Table 3–Allocation Equation
FGLS with common AR1, Dependent Variable: share of ADB disbursements
Sample conditional on selection (positive ADB disbursements)
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3)
Full sample UN sample UN sample
Populationt-1 1.427 1.535 1.473
(4.85)** (5.31)** (5.10)**
Populationt-12 -3.831 -4.096 -3.942
(5.36)** (5.93)** (5.71)**
GDP per capitat-1 -0.00231 -0.00222 -0.00249
(2.25)* (2.32)* (2.49)*
Democracyt-1 0.00007 0.00007 0.00005
(0.29) (0.34) (0.22)
sSDt 0.0217 0.0371 0.0377
(0.34) (0.61) (0.62)
World Exportst-2 -0.0791 -0.0292 -0.00879
(0.23) (0.08) (0.02)
World Importst-2 0.689 0.739 0.712
(1.83) (2.03)* (1.95)
Japanese Exportst-2 0.0472 -0.0302 -0.0461
(0.21) (0.13) (0.20)
Japanese Importst-2 -0.220 -0.213 -0.197
(1.26) (1.23) (1.13)
sJt 0.241 0.184 0.182
(3.57)** (2.71)** (2.67)**
Japanese UN alignmentt-1 0.0191
(1.58)
US Exportst-2 -0.0747 -0.1543 -0.143
(0.34) (0.65) (0.61)
US Importst-2 0.0836 0.1296 0.124
(0.44) (0.71) (0.68)
sUSt 0.0451 0.0301 0.0363
(1.00) (0.69) (0.83)
U.S. UN alignmentt-1 -0.00195
(0.12)
Observations 466 435 435
Number of Countries 22 22 22
AR1 coefficient 0.55 0.55 0.55
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All specification include year dummies.
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Table 4–Allocation Equation in sub-periods
FGLS with common AR1, Dependent Variable: share of ADB disbursements
Sample conditional on selection (positive ADB disbursements)
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4)
l968-1986 1987-2002 l968-1986 1987-2002
Populationt-1 3.759 1.627 5.553 1.695
(3.05)** (5.09)** (4.60)** (5.26)**
Populationt-12 -65.263 -3.910 -79.405 -4.051
(3.50)** (5.13)** (4.74)** (5.28)**
GDP per capitat-1 -0.00374 -0.00144 -0.00194 -0.00222
(1.24) (1.27) (0.63) (1.72)
Democracyt-1 0.00085 -0.00009 0.00073 -0.00015
(1.86) (0.32) (1.53) (0.53)
sSDt 0.00128 0.0474 0.0439 0.0186
(0.01) (0.60) (0.48) (0.24)
World Exportst-2 0.0281 -0.479 0.157 -0.677
(0.07) (0.86) (0.33) (1.21)
World Importst-2 0.0871 -0.100 0.187 -0.0286
(0.19) (0.21) (0.43) (0.06)
Japanese Exportst-2 0.486 -0.0381 0.244 0.109
(1.56) (0.14) (0.65) (0.40)
Japanese Importst-2 0.225 0.318 0.295 0.301
(1.07) (1.37) (1.57) (1.31)
sJt 0.168 0.242 -0.130 0.225
(1.58) (3.43)** (1.15) (3.24)**
Japanese UN alignmentt-1 -0.283 0.0309
(2.48)* (2.38)*
US Exportst-2 -0.0294 -0.142 -0.148 -0.175
(0.10) (0.62) (0.47) (0.75)
US Importst-2 -0.181 0.495 -0.110 0.549
(0.77) (2.11)* (0.53) (2.39)*
sUSt 0.147 0.0653 0.0116 0.0694
(1.46) (1.97)* (0.11) (2.10)*
U.S. UN alignmentt-1 0.157 0.00823
(1.87) (0.43)
Observations 224 241 199 235
Number of Countries 14 20 13 20
AR1 coefficient 0.38 0.58 0.39 0.59
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All specification include year dummies.
